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RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt      
Abstract 
Many avid gamers discount violent conduct in video games as morally insignificant as “it 
is just a game”. However, recent debates among users, regarding video games featuring 
inappropriate forms of virtual violence, suggest a more complex truth. Two experiments (N1 = 
49, N2 = 80) examined users’ guilt responses in order to explore the moral significance of virtual 
violence. In both studies, justification of virtual violence and users’ trait empathy determined  
guilt in a structurally similar way to real-world scenarios: people felt guiltier if they engaged in 
unjustified virtual violence, especially if they were empathetic players. These results show that 
video games are capable of inducing affective moral responses in users. Accordingly, virtual 
violence may be considered morally significant action.  
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Just a Game? Unjustified Virtual Violence Produces Guilt in Empathetic Players 
“I know World of Warcraft is not real life. I know the Geneva Convention doesn't apply 
there. No real-life laws apply there. Blizzard could put a quest to rape characters in there: real 
life anti-rape laws wouldn't apply. Nevertheless, a lot of people would be very disturbed by such 
a quest.” (Bartle, 2008). 
Virtual violence may be defined as any behavior intended to do harm to another video 
game character, who is motivated to avoid the harm-doing (Anderson et al., 2008; Baron & 
Richardson, 1994). Shooting virtual characters for example, in first-person shooter video games, 
provides a typical example of virtual violence. While many studies have shown that virtual 
violence depicted in video games increases aggression in users (Anderson et al., 2010), 
surprisingly little is known about how users perceive and experience virtual violence themselves 
(e.g., Scharrer & Leone, 2006, Young & Whitty, 2010).  
Violent video games are designed for entertainment purposes. Consequently, regular 
violent game players do not typically feel as though they are doing something wrong when they 
shoot virtual characters. A frequent argument put forward by avid gamers is that they are well 
aware that the violence depicted in video games “is not real” (Ladas, 2002). For example, 
Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Vorderer, and Hartmann (2006, see also Whitty, Young, & Goodings, 
in press) asked avid gamers how they experience virtual violence personally. The majority of 
players replied that they enjoyed virtual violence as they believe that shooting virtual characters 
is “just a game” (comparable to chess) and has “nothing to do with killing”. This suggests that 
players maintain a psychologically detached and unaffected stance when playing violent games 
and that virtual violence is too artificial to be considered morally significant and thus trigger any 
moral response in the user.   
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However, Klimmt et al.’s (2006) study suggests that users may also perceive and judge 
virtual violence in a moral way. In their study, a number of players indicated that they would 
find it disturbing if they accidentally shot a child, for example, or if painful injuries were 
depicted in the video game. Related discussion of “inappropriate” virtual violence also exists in 
the video game community. Many video game-related online blogs and forums recently featured 
heated debate regarding a mission included in the popular online-role-playing game “World of 
Warcraft” (“Wrath of the Lich King” expansion; Blizzard, 2008). Within this mission, players 
are required to torture another character to accomplish their goals. An unsystematic review of the 
surrounding debate reveals that some players find this mission disgusting and inappropriate, 
while others stress that “this is fiction [and] you're supposed to enjoy it” (Kajex, 2009). A similar 
controversy surrounded a mission featured in the popular first-person shooter “Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 2” (Activision, 2009). In this (optional) mission, users must massacre civilians 
at an airport. An unsystematic examination of the related debate suggests that many players felt 
uncomfortable with this mission, with even avid gamers stating that they found the mission 
disturbing.    
Taken together, it appears that violence depicted in video games is not unrelated to 
processes of moral perception and judgment. That the violence is depicted in a video game does 
not inevitably eliminate users’ moral responses. Rather, both player factors and within-game 
factors influence users’ moral responses to virtual violence. Some players feel more disturbed 
than others, especially when engaged in particular kinds of virtual violence (such as shooting 
innocent virtual characters, torture, or massacring). However, no study has yet examined users’ 
affective moral responses to virtual violence. The present experiments aim to fill this gap. Two 
studies examine users’ guilt responses to virtual violence. Specifically, the studies examine to 
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what extent justification of violence (as an important within-game factor) and trait empathy (as 
an important user factor) influence users’ guilt responses to virtual violence.   
Guilt Responses to Virtual Violence  
Guilt can be defined as “the dysphoric feeling associated with the recognition that one 
has violated a personally relevant moral or social standard” (Kugler & Jones, 1992, p. 218; 
Tangney, Stuewik & Mashek, 2007). It is typically triggered by the appraisal that one has caused 
harm to somebody, particularly if the harmful action also creates a threat to one's communion 
with, or relatedness to, the victim (Haidt, 2003; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). Guilt 
may arise spontaneously. In his social intuitionist approach to moral judgment, Haidt suggests 
that people’s moral judgments are generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations 
(intuitions), rather than deliberate reasoning. Accordingly, people may often have gut feelings 
about moral issues. Consequently, people may feel as though something is inappropriate or 
wrong, yet they may not be able to express why they feel that way. Haidt (2001) suggests that 
guilt resembles such a gut feeling. Guilt is a self-conscious emotion and thus inherently related to 
the self (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007). Like any affective state, it holds informative value 
for the person experiencing it (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Pizarro, 2000). As such, guilt 
can be understood as a spontaneous feeling that “informs” a person that he or she did something 
wrong.   
Different From Playing Chess: The Moral Significance of Virtual Violence 
One might argue that guilt is an unlikely affective response to virtual violence as video 
games create artificial, fictional worlds that do not feature existing social characters. Users may 
believe that all actions conducted in video games are morally irrelevant as they do not imply any 
harm-doing against living entities. In fact, avid users frequently argue that playing violent video 
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games is identical to playing chess, as neither chess figures nor video game characters can 
actually be harmed. However, the anecdotal evidence that some players feel irritated or bad when 
engaged in inappropriate violent actions in video games (like massacring civilians), suggests that 
the killing of video game characters is accompanied by more intense social and moral responses 
than the “killing” of chess figures.  
Such a notion seems plausible for two further reasons. First, video games increasingly 
display realistic characters and environments which may affect the way users perceive them. In 
contemporary first-person shooters, users encounter three-dimensional characters displaying 
emotions and whose autonomous behavior is driven by artificial intelligence (Morrison & 
Ziemke, 2003). Computer characters now utilize cues which provoke automatic social responses,  
including eye-gazing, biological motion, display of natural facial activity, emotions and 
intelligence, as well as breathing and natural vocal tones (Holtgraves et al., 2007; Morrison & 
Ziemke, 2005; Shapiro, Peña & Hancock, 2006).  It thus seems plausible that users perceive 
virtual characters differently to chess figures, which  provide comparatively artificial 
representations of social beings (see also McCormick, 2001).  
Several strands of research suggest that media technology is a powerful means of evoking 
social illusions. For example, research on movies and television shows typically presumes that 
characters are perceived as social beings displaying morally wrong or right behavior (e.g., 
Raney, 2002; Zillmann, 1991). The audio-visual representation of characters in  video games is 
comparable to characters in movies or TV programs. The perception of video game characters 
may thus be similar to the perception of TV or movie characters. Further, human perception 
research suggests that people automatically identify social entities once they have detected 
biological motion (Ahlstrom, Blake & Ahlstrom, 1997; Morewedge, Preston & Wegner, 2007), 
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readily perceive simple action-sequences with artificial objects as social (Heberlein & Adolphs, 
2004; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Oatley & Yuill, 1985; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), and 
anthropomorphize non-human characters (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Mar & Macrae, 
2006). Given humans’ tendency to perceive even simple animated objects in a social way, it 
seems plausible that the sophisticated display of video game characters will trigger intense social 
perceptions in users.  
Other studies provide more direct support for the argument that virtual environments, 
such as video games, trigger social responses. For example, research by Yee and Bailenson 
(Proteus Effect, 2007, 2009) suggests that the character users navigate through a virtual 
environment shapes the way they perceive themselves and eventually influences their behavior in 
that environment. For example, users navigating an attractive character became friendlier to 
other characters than users navigating an unattractive avatar. Extending this research to virtual 
violence, Peña, Hancock, and Merola (2009) demonstrated that users navigating a character in a 
black robe developed more aggressive attitudes and intentions towards other players than those 
navigating a character in a white robe. 
In general, the majority of studies suggest that users automatically treat computers and 
computer-animated agents as if they were human (Bente, Kraemer, Petersen & deRuiter, 2001; 
Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, & Merget, 2007) or social actors (see “media equation”; Nass 
& Moon, 2000; Reeves & Nass, 1996; Gong, 2008). Users are inclined to feel empathetic with 
animated virtual characters (Morrison & Ziemke, 2005) and tend to feel as though they are in a 
social situation when a computer-animated character is displayed (Garau, Slater, Pertaub, & 
Razzaque, 2005). Likewise,  studies show that characteristics of other virtual characters, such as 
gender (Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, & McCall, 2007), or aspects of the interpersonal 
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virtual setting, such as interpersonal distance (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003), 
influence the way users perceive and interact with these characters socially. In a study by 
Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2002), participants were required to shoot armed soldiers 
in a simple video game. Results showed that White participants shot armed African American 
soldiers more quickly than White soldiers, suggesting that the ethnicity of the virtual characters 
activated participants’ stereotypes. A later study by Slater et al. (2006) replicated the Milgram 
obedience experiment in a virtual setting. Participants followed orders to give lethal electric 
shocks to a virtual stranger. The authors conclude that “in spite of the fact that all participants 
knew for sure that neither the stranger nor the shocks were real, the participants who saw and 
heard her tended to respond to the situation at subjective, behavioral, and physiological levels as 
if it were real”. Taken together, these findings suggest that users tend to respond to virtual 
environments and virtual characters, such as those displayed in violent video games, in a social 
way.    
Secondly, users may be motivated to become involved in a video game, as involvement 
results in heightened enjoyment (Sherry, 2004; Skalski, Lange & Tamborini, 2006). Users may 
thus seek to believe in the apparent reality provided by video games. Discarding the apparent 
reality evoked by media technology may be effortful, if not impossible (e.g., attempting not to 
see depth where a video game displays a three-dimensional space). Hence it seems unlikely that, 
while playing a video game, users constantly engage in the effort necessary to remind them that 
“this is not real” and that “these are not characters but just pixels on a screen”. Such an effort is 
likely to lead to psychological detachment (Cupchik, 2002), diminishing their affective 
responses, including enjoyment (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, p. 1522).      
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In light of the findings reviewed, it seems reasonable to conceive of users’ actions in 
video games as morally significant and directed towards socially perceived characters. 
Accordingly, virtual violence differs from playing chess. Shooting a virtual character during a 
violent video game may lead to different moral responses than hitting a chess figure while 
playing chess. Harming virtual characters in a video game may have greater potential to trigger 
guilt than, for example, playing chess. In chess, guilt is an implausible reaction, as characters are 
unlikely to be perceived as social characters or moral entities, but merely as objects. Feeling 
guilty about shooting a virtual character seems a much more plausible reaction. However, guilt 
responses are likely to vary among different virtual violence scenarios and different users.  
Within-Game Factor Influencing Guilt Responses: Justification of Violence 
Violent video games are designed for entertainment purposes and most players engage in 
virtual violence because they enjoy it. Some violent video game scenarios, however, appear to 
involve violence that is not enjoyed, even by experienced users, and instead evoke irritation and 
perhaps even guilt. The examples we reviewed included scenarios involving torturing virtual 
characters, accidental shooting of children, and massacring innocent civilians. These examples 
suggest that virtual violence may only be enjoyable when it appears to be justified. If deemed 
unjustified, it may trigger guilt. 
Supporting this notion, justification has been highlighted as a crucial determinant of 
people’s moral judgments of violence (Bandura, 2002). Inflicting harm upon others violates 
inner norms and results in guilt only if the harm-doing is considered unjustified (Tangney et al., 
2007). Research on moral disengagement, for example, has shown that people commit cruelties 
without feeling guilty if the situational context frames their actions as justified or necessary 
(Bandura, 2002). Justification also plays a pivotal role in users’ enjoyment of violence in 
RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt     8 
television shows and movies (Raney, 2006; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975). Justification of violence 
is also a typical feature of many violent video games (Smith, Lachlan, & Tamborini, 2003). In 
most violent games, users are required to shoot other characters to save the world or restore 
justice. Additionally, enemies are often portrayed as aggressive soldiers or aliens, which seem 
more appropriate opponents when compared with innocent civilians or children (Hartmann & 
Vorderer, 2010). Under these conditions, players may feel justified to engage in violence and 
may not feel guilty about shooting other characters. Unjustified virtual violence, however, may 
trigger guilt responses. For example, when shooting virtual soldiers for a bad reason, players 
may feel that they are doing something wrong. Accordingly, it can be assumed that: 
H1. Players’ feel guiltier when engaged in unjustified virtual violence than justified 
virtual violence. 
User-Factor Influencing Guilt Responses: Trait Empathy 
One of the most investigated personality traits to moderate individuals’ responses to 
violent conduct is empathy (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Less empathetic people are more prone 
to dehumanize others and perceive them as objects (Haslam, 2006, pp. 262 - 263). Non-
empathetic people are thus more prone to engage in real world aggression than empathetic 
people (e.g., Cohen & Strayer, 1996). Empathetic people, in contrast, tend to feel for the victim 
and suffer more readily if they see that others are hurt (Hoffmann, 2000). Consequently, 
empathetic people are more prone to feeling guilty (Hoffmann, 1998, 2000; Silfver & Helkama, 
2007; Tangney et al., 2007), especially if they are involved in interpersonal violence (Thompson 
& Hoffman, 1980).  
Likewise, research in the domain of television and movies suggests that more empathetic 
users feel more sympathetic towards victims of violence (e.g., Raney, 2002), and that users 
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dislike violence directed towards characters they feel empathetic with (Zillmann, 1991). In a 
study by Aluja-Fabregat and Torrubia-Beltri (1998), users scoring high on psychoticism (a trait 
linked to a lack of empathy) found TV violence more funny and thrilling than other users. 
However, we know of no research that examines how trait empathy affects perceptions of virtual 
violence. Lemmens, Bushman and Konijn (2006) found that less empathetic boys are particularly 
attracted to violent games (see also Sigurdsson, Gudjonsson, Bragason, Kristjansdottir & 
Sigfusdottir, 2006). This corresponds to the notion that trait empathy influences users’ affective 
responses to virtual violence in a similar way as it influences responses to real world violence. 
Accordingly, it can be assumed that:     
H2. The stronger players’ trait empathy, the guiltier they feel when engaged in virtual 
violence. 
Two experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. Study 1 provided a direct 
manipulation of justification of virtual violence. Study 2 manipulated justification of virtual 
violence indirectly, by varying the amount of background information presented prior to the 
game regarding potential victims. Shooting characters whose social background was known 
resembled more unjustified virtual violence than shooting completely anonymous characters. 
Both experiments assessed players’ trait empathy as an additional factor. Experienced level of 
guilt was the outcome measure.   
Study 1 
Method 
Design. A one-factorial (justified vs. unjustified virtual violence), between-subjects 
experiment on participants’ guilt was conducted at a U.S. university1. Trait empathy was 
measured as a second factor. The sample consisted of 49 students (39% male; mean age 19.83 
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years; SD = 1.29; average hours of video game play on a normal weekday: 0.76 hours; SD = 
1.22; average hours of video game play during the weekend: 1.70 hours, SD = 1.98). Students 
were assigned randomly to one of two experimental conditions (njustified = 21, nunjustified = 28). 
Confirming a successful random assignment, independent sample t-tests showed that neither 
experimental condition differed significantly in terms of age, gender, amount of regular video 
game play, or trait empathy (all p > .05).  
Manipulation and procedure. Students played a violent video game scenario adapted 
from the first-person shooter Operation FlashpointTM (Bohemia Interactive, 2001). In order to 
manipulate the game, two student programmers were hired to edit the game’s source code 
(“modding”, Au, 2002). A new cinematic introduction was developed to introduce the game 
scenario. This was achieved by recording new voice-overs and attaching these to recorded virtual 
camera-flights through the newly developed scenario. The introduction depicted a torture camp 
in the fictional Oka region in which innocent people were murdered by paramilitary forces. 
Depending upon the experimental condition, students learned that they would play either a 
soldier from the United Nations (UN), attempting to attack the torture camp to restore humanity 
(justified condition), or a soldier from the paramilitary forces continuing the cruelty and 
defending the camp (unjustified condition). Following the cinematic introduction, the actual 
game play began. During the game, users were required to walk through the virtual torture camp 
and  shoot as many opponents as possible (either UN soldiers or paramilitary soldiers). In order 
that the game was also suitable for novice users, the original game play of Operation Flashpoint 
was modified so that players could not die, had unlimited ammunition, and could only use one 
weapon (a pump gun). After 10 minutes of game play, students were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire.   
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 Measures.  Trait empathy was measured using a scale taken from Raney (2002). 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement to 11 different statements (e.g., “I am often 
touched by things that I see happen” or “When I'm upset at someone I usually try to put myself 
in their shoes for a while”) on a five point scale (1 = “I do not agree at all” to 5 = “I totally 
agree”). All items were collapsed into a mean-index (α = .72; M = 3.69; SD = .47). 
Guilt was measured using a 3-item guilt subscale taken from Hartmann and Vorderer 
(2010). After reviewing existing measures to assess guilt, the authors opted for an adaptation of 
the guilt-subscale of the Differential – Emotion – Scale (DESIV; Kotsch, Gerbing & Schwartz, 
1982) to directly assess guilt responses to violent video games. The three items assessed how 
often participants felt as though they did something wrong when playing the game (e.g., “feel 
regret”, “sorry about something you did” or “feel like you did something wrong”) on a five point 
scale (1 = “rarely or never” to 5 = “very often”). All three items were collapsed into a mean-
index (α = .94; M = 1.95; SD = 1.22). 
To check for the effectiveness of the manipulation, students were asked to indicate 
agreement to the item “When playing the game I had the notion to fight for a justified purpose” 
(1 = “not at all” to 5 = “totally agree”; M = 2.39, SD = 1.27). Students were also asked how far 
they supported or opposed the motives of the authority they fought for (1 = “strongly opposed” 
to 5 = “strongly supported”; M = 2.78, SD = 1.20). Both items were substantially correlated (r = 
.58; p < .01) and were thus collapsed into a mean-index (M = 2.58, SD = 1.10).   
Results 
 Manipulation check. Students in the unjustified violence condition (defending the 
torture camp) obtained significantly lower scores on the treatment check index (M = 2.16, SD = 
RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt     12 
1.05) than students in the justified violence condition (fighting for UN forces; M = 3.14, SD = .2, 
t(47) = 3.44, p < .01). The manipulation was therefore successful.  
 Hypotheses. Both hypotheses were tested in a joint hierarchical regression.2 In a first 
step, to check for potential main effects, guilt as a dependent variable was regressed on the 
experimental factor (justification, entered as a contrast-coded -1/+1 variable) and trait empathy 
(z-standardized) as independent variables. In a second step, to check for potential interaction 
effects, guilt was regressed on a justification x trait empathy interaction term (see Aiken & West, 
1991). Results are displayed in both Table 1 and Figure 1. 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of justification on guilt (see Table 1). In line 
with H1, students who engaged in unjustified virtual violence reported higher levels of guilt 
when playing than students who engaged in justified virtual violence (b = 0.48, β = .39, t(46) = 
2.95, p < .01). H1 was therefore supported. The analysis also revealed an effect of trait empathy 
on guilt, although this was only a statistical trend (b = 0.29, β = .24, t(46) = 1.80, p = .079). As 
assumed in H2, the more empathetic students felt guiltier when engaging in virtual violence. 
Results are in line with H2, although they do not reach statistical significance. These effects were 
qualified by a justification x trait empathy interaction that also approached significance (b = 
0.30, β = .24, t(45) = 1.88, p = .067). As shown in Figure 1, simple slope analyses of guilt at 
three levels of trait empathy (low = one SD below the mean, average = mean, high = one SD 
above the mean) revealed a strong influence of justification on guilt, particularly for highly 
empathetic students (b = 0.77, β = .63, t(45) = 3.48, p < .01). Application of the Johnson-
Neyman technique, following a procedure suggested by Hayes and Matthes (2009), revealed that 
the impact of experimental condition became significant at a level of empathy ≥ 3.49.  
[Please place Table 1 about here] 
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[Please place Figure 1 about here] 
Conclusion 
 The present study examined users’ guilt responses to virtual violence. In the study, 
players felt guiltier if they shot video game characters for an unjustified reason than if they shot 
characters for a justified reason. Additionally, more empathetic players tended to feel guiltier 
than less empathetic players. However, results suggest that the guilt responses are influenced by 
an interaction between both factors. Players felt guilty under conditions of unjustified violence if 
they scored high on trait empathy, but not if they scored low on trait empathy. 
Taken together, the results suggest that violent video games are capable of inducing 
“moral responses” in users. Dependent upon both user factors and factors embedded within a 
video game, shooting virtual characters may induce in users a feeling of wrongdoing. This 
corresponds to the anecdotes of “immoral virtual violence” and contradicts the notion of some 
gamers that virtual violence is morally insignificant. Rather, the pattern of guilt responses 
observed in the present study is similar to that expected from comparable real-life situations. 
This similarity may support the notion that virtual violence is more “than just a game”, as the 
same factors affecting people’s guilt responses to real-world violence also affect their guilt 
responses to virtual violence.  
Study 2 
 To confirm the results of Study 1, a second study was conducted. Study 2 utilized a new 
video game stimulus and a new treatment of justification of violence to examine if the results 
obtained in Study 1 may be generalized to other conditions of virtual violence. In contrast to the 
direct manipulation of justification of virtual violence applied in Study 1, Study 2 utilized an 
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indirect manipulation by examining if the presence or absence of social background information 
regarding virtual victims affected players’ guilt responses.  
The fungibility of opponents, i.e., “seeing people as interchangeable with others of their 
type” (Haslam, 2006, p. 253), is a characteristic of many real-world conflicts which involve 
uniform soldiers and, typically, opponents whose social background is completely unknown. 
Perceiving others as faceless or fungible entities has been identified as an aspect of objectified 
(Nussbaum, 1999) or dehumanized perception (Haslam, 2006). In other words, faceless or 
fungible opponents are likely to be perceived as objects rather than unique human beings. When 
people perceive others in an objectified or dehumanized way, they are more prone to deny that 
they are worthy of moral concern (Haslam, 2006). Violence enacted against such faceless 
individuals may be more easily perceived as justified. 
Whether or not people perceive others as fungible entities seems to depend upon the 
accessibility of humanizing social background information regarding the private lives of others 
(Haslam, 2006; Nussbaum, 1999). People perceive others as human if they know about their 
private life, individual emotions, and subjective preferences. Learning about the social 
background of others provokes us to perceive these others in a more human light. Consequently, 
people concede proper moral treatment more readily to characters whose life they have 
knowledge of (Haslam, 2006). Fungible individuals are more likely to be perceived as objects 
whereas people, whose social background is known, are more likely to be perceived as social 
human beings. Harming individuals who appear fungible thus appears to be comparatively 
justified, whereas harming a person who is known appears to be unjustified. Guilt responses 
should consequently vary in accordance with this. Consistent with this assumption, Haidt (2003, 
p. 861) remarks that “guilt can be triggered in properly socialized adults even by the appraisal 
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that one has harmed a stranger, but guilt reactions appear to be stronger and far more common in 
close relationships.”  
In most contemporary first-person shooters, opponents remain interchangeable, faceless, 
and fungible. Users are frequently required to fight against soldiers or characters wearing 
uniform. In addition, users’ typically do not learn about the social background of opponents. 
Thus, shooting these virtual opponents may not evoke any moral irritation or guilt in users. Guilt 
responses may differ, however, if users are required to shoot opponents whose social background 
(e.g., family background, individual preferences etc.) is known. Under such circumstances, 
virtual opponents may resemble human beings, whose killing may thus feel wrong. Accordingly, 
it can be assumed that: 
H1. Shooting game characters whose social background is known results in higher levels 
of guilt than shooting game characters whose background is not known.  
Study 2 tested this modified version of H1 (with social background providing an indirect 
manipulation of justification of violence). In addition, H2 was tested again (the higher the trait 
empathy, the stronger the feelings of guilt when engaged in virtual violence). 
Method 
 Design. A one-factorial (social background vs. no social background) between-subjects 
experiment on participants’ perceived guilt was conducted at a Dutch university. Trait empathy 
was again assessed as a second factor. Overall, 80 participants (66% male; mean age 22.30 years; 
SD = 6.22; average number of days of video game play in a normal week: 1.69 days, SD = 2.22; 
average number of hours in a normal gaming session: 1.92 hours, SD = 1.61) were assigned 
randomly to one of two experimental conditions (both n = 40). Confirming a successful random 
assignment, independent samples t-tests revealed that the two experimental conditions did not 
RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt     16 
differ significantly in terms of age, gender, trait empathy, and amount of regular video game play 
(all p > .05).  
Manipulation and procedure. Students played a manipulated version of a first-person 
shooter game for 10 minutes. The game was developed with FPS CreatorTM  
(www.thegamecreators.com), a commercially available, semi-professional editor. For the present 
study, a hotel scenario was developed in which students played the role of a special agent. In a 
short mission briefing they were told that the hotel was occupied by some people and that they 
should chose a gun and eliminate them. 
The manipulation of available social background information regarding game characters 
was introduced before game play. Students received profiles of each character that they needed 
to eliminate during the mission (see Figure 2). Each profile included a photo of the character 
(matching the figure in the game), a name, and occupation (e.g., secretary). In addition, half of 
the participants received social background information about each character (e.g., the town the 
character comes from, if s/he has children and a partner, his or her individual preferences, etc.). 
The remaining half did not receive this information.  
[Please place Figure 2 about here] 
 Measures. The same trait empathy measure utilized in Study 1 was applied. Again, all 
items were collapsed into a mean-index (α = .75; M = 3.38; SD = .57).  
 Guilt was also measured as in Study 1. Again, items were collapsed into a mean-index (α 
= .80; M = 2.18; SD = 1.05). 
 As a treatment check on the manipulated background information, participants were 
asked to indicate their agreement to two statements: “I feel like I personally know the characters 
that I just saw” (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree; M = 2.00, SD = 1.10) and “The 
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characters I just read about all seem to have their unique personal characteristics” (1 = totally 
disagree to 7 = totally agree; M = 3.41, SD = 1.23). Both items were reasonably correlated (r = 
.31, p < .01) and were collapsed into a mean-index (M = 2.71; SD = .94).  
Results 
 Manipulation check. Participants who received background information regarding the 
characters in the game, obtained significantly higher scores on the treatment check index (M = 
2.95; SD = .90) in comparison to participants who received no background information (M = 
2.46, SD = .94, t(78) = 2.38, p < .05). The manipulation was therefore successful.  
Hypotheses. As in Study 1, the two hypotheses were tested in a moderated regression 
(Aiken & West, 1991). Guilt was regressed on background information and trait empathy in a 
first step, and on a background information x empathy interaction term in a second step. Results 
are displayed in both Table 2 and Figure 3.  
[Please place Table 2 about here] 
[Please place Figure 3 about here] 
 The regression revealed a main effect of available social background information on 
guilt, although this was only a statistical trend (b = 0.20, β = .19, t(77) = 1.80, p = .075). In line 
with H1, players who shot game characters with a known social background (unjustified virtual 
violence) reported higher levels of guilt than players who shot game characters with an unknown 
social background (justified virtual violence). This effect only approached significance, but the 
results are in line with H1.  
 The regression further revealed a significant effect of trait empathy on guilt (b = 0.28, β = 
.27, t(77) = 2.51, p < .05). In line with H2, the more empathetic players felt guiltier when 
inflicting virtual violence upon game characters. H2 was therefore supported.  
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 As in Study 1, both effects were qualified by a social background information x trait 
empathy interaction which was observed as a statistical trend (b = 0.19, β = .18, t(76) = 1.67, p = 
.099). Probing this interaction further reveals that highly empathetic players felt guilty when 
shooting characters with a known social background (b = 0.39, β = .37, t(76) = 2.48, p < .05), 
whereas the guilt reported by non-empathetic players did not differ between conditions. 
Application of the Johnson-Neyman Technique (Hayes & Matthes, 2009) revealed that the effect 
of experimental conditions became significant at a level of empathy ≥ 3.44. 
Conclusion 
As in the first study, Study 2 examined users’ guilt responses to virtual violence. If 
virtual violence can be characterized by the phrase “it’s just a game”, as many avid players 
claim, affective moral responses should be similar regardless of whether virtual characters’ 
social background is known or unknown. However, as in real-life situations, the present study 
suggests that people felt guiltier when they shot video game characters whose private social 
background was known than when the character’s background was unknown. In addition, as in 
Study 1, and in line with what one might expect from real-life settings, this effect was true only 
for the more empathetic players. Non-empathetic players did not feel guiltier in one or the other 
condition.  
Discussion 
This article presents two studies which examined guilt as an affective moral response to 
virtual violence. Avid users of violent video games often refer to the argument that video game 
play is “just a game” and that they are always able to distinguish between fiction and reality 
(Ladas, 2002). In line with this argument, a number of avid violent video game players compare 
virtual violence to playing chess and deny that virtual violence bears any moral significance. 
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Results of the present studies, however, suggest that unjustified virtual violence triggers stronger 
guilt responses in users than justified virtual violence, particularly when users are more 
empathic. This indicates that video game violence is capable of evoking moral responses in 
users. Whether or not violent actions carried out in a game are considered right or wrong, and 
thus trigger guilt responses, depends upon within-game factors and user factors. Consequently, a 
key finding of the present studies is that virtual violence is morally more significant than the 
claim “this is just a game” would suggest.  
The results of these studies suggest that not only is virtual violence capable of triggering 
guilt responses in users, but that the observed pattern of guilt responses is structurally identical to 
the pattern one would expect in real-world scenarios. Prior research on real-world violence 
suggests that justification effectively diminishes guilt when harming others (Bandura, 2002; 
Opotow & Weis, 2000) and that empathetic people feel guiltier than others when engaging in 
interpersonal violence (Thompson & Hoffmann, 1980). The present studies suggest that the same 
factors shape users’ guilt responses to virtual violence. Interestingly,  in both studies even the 
more empathetic players did not feel guilty when they shot game characters for a justified reason. 
Similar to real-world conflicts, good justification allowed even empathetic players to enter a state 
of moral disengagement (Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010) and to inflict harm upon others without 
feeling guilty.  
It is tempting to speculate as to why virtual violence is capable of inducing guilt 
responses and also why the same factors underlie guilt responses to real and virtual violence. In 
the present studies, guilt was conceptualized as an automatic response to a situation. In line with 
Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist approach of moral judgment, it was argued that guilt may be 
understood as a spontaneous feeling resulting from intuitional moral judgments. In this article, 
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more empathetic users engaged in unjustified virtual violence may have spontaneously felt as 
though they did something wrong, whereas others may have spontaneously judged their actions 
to be appropriate. Although not directly tested, users may have felt spontaneously guilty  
independent of their awareness that the depicted violence was not real. Such a notion is 
speculative, but corresponds to a growing amount of research indicating that users automatically 
respond to virtual environments to a certain extent as though they were real (Bailenson, 
Blascovich, Beall & Loomis, 2003; McCall et al., 2009; Nass & Moon, 2000; Slater et al., 2006; 
Weber, Ritterfeld, & Mathiak, 2006; Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009). Bailenson et al. 
(2003) argue that users respond to real and virtual settings in a similar way only in terms of their 
automatic responses, yet distinguish between real and virtual settings when utilizing consciously 
controlled processes. Research related to the “media equation” (Reeves & Nass, 1996; Nass & 
Moon, 2000) also suggests that people, despite the apparent asocial nature of computers, tend to 
treat computers as social, because they respond to them in a mindless way. Users’ guilt responses 
in the present studies may thus be interpreted as the result of automatic processes (and related 
intuitional moral judgments, Haidt, 2001).  
Methodological Limitations  
There are a number of limitations with the current studies. First, both relied on small 
sample sizes. As a consequence, the power to detect significant effects was quite low. In 
addition, both studies relied on student samples, which tend to be highly educated. While trait 
empathy and amount of regular video game play did not differ between randomly assigned 
conditions, it may be that students experience (virtual) violence in a systematically different way 
than older and/or less educated people. Future studies must replicate the present findings with 
more diverse and larger samples.  
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Secondly, both studies relied on self-report to assess users’ feelings of guilt. While both 
questionnaires mixed guilt items with other items, an explicit measure of guilt may induce 
suspicion in participants and thus trigger demand characteristics or social desirability effects 
(Schwarz & Oyserman, 2004). Future studies should also incorporate implicit measures of guilt 
(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Additionally, retrospective questionnaires may be prone to bias, 
particularly when seeking to assess the intensity or frequency of human experiences (Schwarz & 
Oyserman, 2004). Future studies may thus complement the present results by applying process-
based measures of guilt.      
Future Considerations 
The present findings raise a number of new questions. Players felt guiltier when engaged 
in unjustified violence against other video game characters. An intriguing follow-up would be to 
explore to what extent video game characters hold the potential to be perceived as “moral 
entities”, in possession of moral status (Olthof et al., 2008; Warren, 1997) and thus deserving of 
proper moral treatment? Where should video game figures be positioned in the (perceptual and 
also moral) continuum between objects such as chess figures and existing human beings? The 
present research suggests that video game characters are perceived as more social than objects, 
yet do not trigger the same perceptions as human beings. Future media-psychological research 
bridging the various perspectives (e.g., computer-visualization, perception, moral psychology; 
see Kwan & Fiske, 2008) may help to further illuminate the moral status of video game 
characters. 
A second, related question is whether guilt responses also depend upon the display 
qualities of virtual characters. It may be argued, for example, that affective moral responses will 
become more likely in the future, as video games portray characters in an increasingly realistic 
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way (see Gong, 2008). Based on a semiotic approach, Zillmann (2006) suggests that we must 
distinguish between the iconic and the symbolic qualities of media content. A media stimulus has 
a high iconic quality if it mimics the physical features of a stimulus. A media stimulus has a high 
symbolic quality if it does not mimic the physical qualities, yet still identifies a certain stimulus 
by triggering culture- or convention-based associations (e.g., a red heart reminds people of love). 
Accordingly, virtual violence may evoke guilt responses due to the iconic qualities of 
contemporary video games, i.e., the fact that they display characters in an audio-visual way 
which matches the physical properties of human beings. Alternatively, virtual violence may 
evoke guilt responses due to the symbolic qualities of video games. Would empathetic users also 
feel guilty if they shot less realistic characters (such as Pac-Man) for unjustified reasons, 
particularly if these characters were symbolically represented as a “protect-worthy” group (e.g., 
baby Pac-Men)? Future research may help answer this question and clarify whether the present 
findings may also be generalized to virtual violence against other virtual characters.  
Thirdly, future research should investigate users’ guilt responses in light of more 
reflective perceptions of virtual violence. In particular, future studies may investigate if players’ 
spontaneous moral responses are regulated upon conscious reflection (Schramm & Wirth, 2008), 
and if these responses are influenced by’ awareness that video games are “not real”. A study by 
Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) suggests that users’ guilt responses and negative affect are 
negatively correlated with awareness that depicted violence is “just a game”. Players may also 
differ in their motivation to enjoy virtual violence and become engaged in a violent game, in 
their knowledge of virtual violence, and also in their use of effective distancing strategies. Future 
studies may clarify if users’ guilt responses to virtual violence are affected by these factors, and 
if and how players regulate their moral affective responses to virtual violence.   
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Impact on Existing Lines of Research 
The present studies contribute to several existing lines of research. First, they contribute 
to the study of the impact of violent video games on aggression (Anderson et al., 2010). Past 
research suggests that the impact of violent video game play on aggression increases the more 
players become involved in the game play (e.g., Farrar, Krcmar, & Nowak, 2006; Persky & 
Blascovich, 2008). Based on the present findings, we may speculate that those players who feel 
that they are doing something wrong begin to regulate the noxious experience (Schramm & 
Wirth, 2008). They may thus enter a more critical and distanced reception mode, which may also 
serve to diminish the aggressive effects of the displayed virtual violence. This may be the case 
particularly if noxious feelings of guilt arise. Guilt induced by a spontaneous empathetic feeling 
for a victim “typically compels us to stop short of immoral action” (Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 
2009, p. 1; Pizarro, 2000), and may exert the same effect in the context of virtual violence.  
In the present study, empathetic people felt particularly guilty. A number of researchers 
have considered players’ empathy as a potential moderator of the aggressive effects of violent 
video game play (Bartholow et al., 2005; Konijn, Bijvank, van der Heijden, van Der Molen, & 
Hoorn, 2008). Anderson et al. (2008, p. 1071) state that “there is some evidence from television 
research that a focus on the pain and suffering of the victims of violence may reduce its harmful 
impact”. Based on the present studies, we may speculate that empathetic people feel particularly 
guilty when engaged in unjustified virtual violence which, in turn, may urge them to cease the 
immoral action (e.g., stop shooting characters), or to re-consider the situation and take a more 
critical perspective on the game play. These and similar processes may moderate the aggressive 
effects. Future studies may thus explore whether empathy-driven guilt moderates the effects of 
violent game play on aggression.  
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The present findings may also connect to entertainment research. If people feel guilty 
about something they did to others, and do not have the chance to repair the harm done, they 
engage in self-punishment through self denied pleasure (‘Dobby’ effect, Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009). This same self-punishment may occur if people feel guilty when playing violent video 
games. Sporadic evidence exists to suggest that guilt reduces enjoyment of violent video games 
(Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010). We may speculate that non-empathetic people may feel 
particularly entertained by violent video games, while empathetic people enjoy them less. 
Indeed, Lemmens et al. (2006) found that less empathetic boys were particularly attracted to 
violent games (see also Sigurdsson et al., 2006). Future studies may explore more fully the 
relationship between users’ trait empathy, their affective experiences of virtual violence, and 
exposure to violent video games.  
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Notes 
1This study is presented in full detail in Hartmann and Vorderer (2010). However, the 
effects of trait empathy have not yet been analyzed.  
2Following recommendations from related methodological literature (Bissonnette, Ickes, 
Berstein, & Knowles, 2006; Cohen, 1983; Irwin & McClelland, 2003), we favored a moderated 
regression over an ANOVA in order to avoid dichotomization of the empathy variable based on 
a median split. In the moderated regression, we examined simple slopes by applying the SPSS 
macro offered by O’Connor (1998).  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Guilt (N = 49) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Justification .48 .16 .39** .48 .16 .39** 
Empathy .29 .16 .24† .27 .16 .22† 
Justification x Empathy    .30 .16 .24† 
R2 .196 .255 
F for change in R2 5.62** 3.52† 
Note: Justification was a binary variable, contrast-coded as -1/+1; empathy was z-standardized. 
95% CI of unstandardized regression coefficients in Model 2: Justification = 0.16–0.80; empathy 
= -0.05–0.59; justification x empathy = -0.02–0.62; †p < .1, *p  <  .05, **p  <  .01. 
 
Table 2 
Study 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Guilt (N = 80) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Background Information .20 .11 .19† .20 .11 .19† 
Empathy .28 .11 .27* .31 .11 .29** 
Background info. x Empathy    .19 .11 .18† 
R2 .112 .144 
F for change in R2 4.88* 2.79† 
Note: Background information was a binary variable, contrast-coded as -1/+1; empathy was z-
standardized. 95% CI of unstandardized regression coefficients in Model 2: Background 
information = -0.02–0.42; empathy = 0.08–0.53; background information x empathy = -0.04–
0.41; †p < .1, *p  <  .05, **p  <  .01. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Interaction between Justification of Virtual Violence and Trait Empathy on Guilt (N = 
49). 
Figure 2. Example of the profiles used to manipulate social background information in Study 2. 
The left profile includes no social background information and the right profile includes social 
background information. Descriptions are in Dutch.   
Figure 3. Interaction between Background Information about Video Game Opponents and Trait 
Empathy on Guilt (N = 80). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Trait empathy was z-standardized and split at three levels; low = one SD below the mean, 
average = mean, high = one SD above the mean.  
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Note: Trait empathy was z-standardized and split at three levels; low = one SD below the mean, 
average = mean, high = one SD above the mean.  
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